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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jerry Lee McClain appeals from his conviction for violation of a no-contact 
order, domestic violence in the presence of a child, and intimidating a witness 
with a persistent violator enhancement. On appeal, McClain challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his persistent violator enhancement. 
Additionally, McClain contends the district court erred by admitting an 
unredacted version of an interrogation. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
McClain repeatedly kicked, hit and slapped his wife, Janna McClain, 
during a sexual encounter while their young son was asleep in his bedroom 
within hearing distance. (11/10/2012 JT Tr., p.178, L.9 - p.188, L.17.) The 
state charged McClain with rape and felony domestic battery. (38576 R., pp.25-
27.) After McClain was arrested on those charges, he called Janna from jail and 
asked her to "speak to the prosecutors" and "change her story." (11/10/2012 JT 
Tr., p.196, Ls.7-20.) The state charged McClain with intimidating a witness and 
violation of a no contact order. (38577 R., pp.26-7.) The state subsequently 
filed a sentencing enhancement alleging McClain had previously been convicted 
of two or more felonies. (38577 R., pp.33-35.) The criminal cases were 
consolidated for trial. (38577 R., p.32.) 
The state filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of "[t]he 
history of domestic violence in the relationship [between McClain and his wife], 
including the power and control [McClain] exercised over the victim daily, and the 
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prior incidents of domestic violence," asserting they were "both relevant and 
probative to the case at hand." (38576 R., p.97.) After a hearing on the motion, 
the district court concluded: 
[I]n the context of this case, because the state's evidence is so 
strong without it and the likelihood of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant in this case outweighs the relatively slight relevance of 
this information, I'm not going to let it in on the state's case in chief. 
(10/14/2010 Tr., p.43, Ls.5-10.) 
Before the trial began, McClain objected to the introduction by the state of 
a video of his interrogation by law enforcement (11/08/2012 JT Tr., p.56, L.22 -
p.58, L.13), claiming the 68 minute video related, almost in its entirety, "to other 
events, acts, and wrongs other than the night in question" (11/08/2010 JT Tr., 
p.57, Ls.6-8). The state argued it had already redacted the video in accordance 
with the court's previous evidentiary ruling and there were no "mentions of any 
prior acts of violence" between the McClains, nor any "mention of the cycle of 
power and controL" (11/08/2010 JT Tr., p.58, Ls.21-24.) The court indicated it 
would review the video at a later time and "rule accordingly with instructions to 
the state either to redact or not." (11/08/2010 JT Tr., p.65, Ls.2-4.) Before ruling 
on the admissibility of the video, the court granted McClain's motion for mistrial 
after Janna volunteered testimony that violated the court's earlier ruling 
prohibiting the introduction of evidence of the volatile and controlling nature of 
McClain's relationship with Janna. (11/08/2010 JT Tr., p.100, L.17 - p.105, L.6.) 
Prior to the start of the second trial, the court had time to review the video 
of McClain's police interrogation. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.13, Ls.10-14.) The court 
denied McClain's request to exclude the first 57 minutes and 20 seconds of the 
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video finding the evidence relevant and the unfair prejudice to McClain was not 
outweighed by that relevance. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.13, Ls.15-23.) The court 
also denied McClain's request to exclude the last four minutes of the video, 
agreeing with the state that the statements therein were relevant to McClain's 
attack on the credibility of the witnesses against him. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.18, 
L.9 - p.19, L.15.) During the second trial, McClain again objected to the 
introduction of the video based on his claim that it was "fraught with references to 
prior acts or wrongs." (11/12/2010 JT Tr., p.224, Ls.6-8.) The state stood on its 
previous response to McClain's objection and the court's previous ruling that the 
video was admissible in its entirety. (11/12/2010 JT Tr., p.226, Ls.22-25.) The 
court stood by its previous ruling and allowed the introduction of the video 
interrogation of McClain. (11/12/2010 JT Tr., p.227, Ls.1-2.) 
The jury ultimately found McClain guilty of felony domestic violence, 
intimidation of a witness, and violation of a no contact order. (38576 R., pp.146-
147; 38577 R., pp.92-93; 11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.397, L.1 - p.398, L.12.) The trial 
immediately moved to the production of evidence on the sentencing 
enhancement wherein state's exhibits 62 and 63, identified as "certified 
judgments of conviction," were admitted by stipulation. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., 
pA05, L.15 - pA06, L.2.) Exhibit 62 was a certified judgment of conviction 
showing McClain had been convicted of possession of a controlled substance in 
Canyon County. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., pA07, Ls.1-9.) Exhibit 63 was described to 
the jury by the state as follows: 
Then referring to State's Exhibit 63, this is a little bit more 
difficult to read. You can see up at the top of the certified judgment 
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of conviction that it was entered in Malheur County, Oregon. You 
can see the defendant's name, Jerry Lee McClain. You can see 
the case number there. You can see that he was convicted of 
assault number three - or assault in the third degree. 
And then up in the corner, you can see that the judgment of 
conviction was entered on August 21 of 1991. 
And then if you flip back to the page that contains the 
indictment in this case, which is also part of the judgment of 
conviction here, you can see that this is a felony. In Count I, it 
specifically states there "unlawfully, feloniously, and intentionally." 
And, again, this is all part of State's Exhibit 63. And these 
are self-authenticating documents, so you can consider them as 
true and correct copies." 
(11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.407, L.23 - p.408, L.19.) McClain argued to the jury that 
exhibit 63 did not prove that the conviction out of Oregon was for a felony: 
Going back to the first page, he was found - he was 
convicted of the following offense: Assault third degree. 
It does not indicate whether that is a felony or misdemeanor 
charge. I don't see that on the document. Here the state has to 
prove that both of these charges are felonies. 
(11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.409, Ls.4-10.) The state countered this argument with 
reference to the indictment: "[Y]ou can see, referring to this document, the 
indictment, that this is a felony." (11/10/2010 JTTr., p.409, Ls.18-20.) 
During deliberation of the Part II, the jury sent a question to the court 
which asked, "Is the most serious level of misdemeanor Class A[?]" (11/10/2010 
JT Tr., p.426, Ls.4-5.) Before the court could respond to the jury's question, the 
jury came back with a verdict finding McClain had previously been convicted of 
the two alleged felonies. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.426, L.6 - p.428, L.6; 38576 R., 
p.148, 38577 R., p.94.) McClain filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, claiming 
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the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support the verdict on the Part II. 
(38576 R., pp.202-204, 38577 R., pp.95-97.) The court denied the motion for 
judgment of acquittal (38576 R., pp.207-209; 38577 R., pp.98-100) and 
sentenced McClain to concurrent enhanced unified sentences of 10 years fixed 
followed by 10 years indeterminate for intimidating a witness and felony domestic 
battery, and one year on the violation of a no contact order. (38576 R., pp.226-
228; 38577 R., pp.109-111.) 
McClain timely appeals. (38576 R., pp.229-232; 38577 R., pp.112-115.) 




McClain states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the State present insufficient evidence to support the 
jury's finding that Mr. McClain was a persistent violator? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted the 
un-redacted copy of Mr. McClain's interrogation? 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was there substantial competent evidence to support the jury's verdict 
finding McClain guilty of being a persistent violator? 
2. Has McClain failed to establish that the district court erred in admitting the 




McClain Has Failed To Establish The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support The 
JUry'S Verdict Of Guilty On The Persistent Violator Enhancement 
A. Introduction 
McClain asserts there was insufficient evidence presented to support the 
jury's verdict finding him guilty of being a persistent violator. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.7-10.) Specifically, McClain contends "the information regarding the prior 
conviction in Oregon was not sufficient to support his conviction." (Appellant's 
brief, p.7.) A review of the record shows McClain is incorrect. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope." State 
v. Marsh, 2011 WL 6430816 *4 (Ct. App. 2011). An appellate court will not set 
aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict if there is substantial 
evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mi"er, 131 Idaho 
288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 
826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759,761,735 P.2d 1070, 
1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting this review the appellate court will not 
substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight 
to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence. Mi"er, 131 Idaho at 292,955 P.2d at 607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 
101,822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 P.2d at 1072. 
Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed 
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in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; 
Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. 
C. McClain Has Failed To Establish That Exhibit 63 Does Not Constitute 
Substantial, Competent Evidence That He Was Previously Convicted Of 
Felony Third Degree Assault For Purposes Of The Persistent Violator 
Enhancement 
Idaho law provides for a sentencing enhancement for "[a]ny person 
convicted for the third time of the commission of a felony[.]" Idaho Code § 19-
2514. Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1601 requires a jury to unanimously 
determine if the evidence presented supports the state's contention that the 
defendant has been convicted of felony offenses on at least two prior occasions. 
The jury in the instant case was so instructed: 
Ladies and gentlemen, we're prepared now to proceed on 
Part II of the Information. 
So, I'm going to read you the Amended Information Part II. 
It reads as follows: 
"Greg H. Bower, prosecuting attorney in and for the County 
of Ada, State of Idaho, who in the name of and by the authority of 
said state prosecutes in its behalf, in proper person comes now 
before the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, and given the court to 
understand it to be further informed that as Part II of the 
Information on file herein, the Defendant Jerry Lee McClain is a 
persistent violator of the law in that the defendant has heretofore 
been convicted of two or more felonies, to wit, number one, that the 
said Defendant Jerry Lee McClain, on or about the date, 3rd day of 
July, 2002, was convicted of the crime of possession of a controlled 
substances, a felony, in the County of Canyon, State of Idaho, by 
virtue of that certain judgment of conviction made and entered by 
the Honorable Judge Kerrick in Case No. CR-01-020285 C. 
"Count 2, that the said Defendant Jerry Lee McClain, on or 
about the 21 st day of August in 1991, was convicted of the crime of 
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assault in the third degree, a felony in the County of Malheur, State 
of Oregon. 
"Wherefore, the said defendant, having been convicted 
previously of two or more felonies, should be considered a 
persistent violator of the law and should be sentenced accordingly 
pursuant to Idaho Code 19-2514 upon conviction of the charge or 
charges contained in Part I of the Information. 
"Dated this 29th of June 2012, signed by Ada County 
Prosecuting Attorney." 
Ladies and gentlemen, a moment ago I read you a jury 
instruction letting you know that having found the defendant guilty 
of two of these predicate offenses, the state now alleges that the 
defendant has these two prior felony convictions. 
The burden is on the state to prove your unanimous 
satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt to each and every one 
of the allegations contained in Part " of the Information as I just 
read to you. 
(11/10/2010JTTr., p.402, L.19-p.404, L.17.) 
In support of its allegation that McClain was a persistent violator, the state 
offered two certified judgments of conviction, identified as Exhibits 62 and 63. 
(11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.405, L.15 - p.406, L.2.) Based on this evidence, the jury 
convicted McClain of being a persistent violator. (38576 R., p.148, 38577 R., 
p.94.) On appeal, McClain asserts the evidence admitted was insufficient to 
prove McClain had been convicted of two prior felonies because Exhibit 63 did 
not establish "that assault in the third degree was a felony." (Appellant's brief, 
p.10.) A review of the record shows McClain's claim is without merit for two 
reasons. First, because the record before this Court is insufficient to show 
exactly what the Oregon judgment of conviction stated, it must be presumed to 
support the district court's ruling denying McClain's motion for a judgment of 
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acquittal for insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict of guilt on the 
sentencing enhancement. Additiona"y, the state did provide the necessary proof 
at trial, that being the fact of the prior conviction. 
Exhibit 63 was offered and admitted by stipulation as a self-authenticating 
document. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.405, L.15 - p.406, L.3.) McClain argued at 
trial that the judgment of conviction did not indicate whether the aggravated 
assault in the third degree of which he was convicted was a misdemeanor or a 
felony and, as such, was insufficient evidence to support a finding that McClain 
had committed a prior felony offense. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.409, Ls.4-10.) 
The exhibit list from McClain's jury trial identifies State's Exhibit 63 as a 
judgment of conviction out of Malheur County. (Exhibits, p.1.) Although referred 
to at trial as including an indictment as we" as a certified copy of judgment of 
conviction (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.408, Ls.10-19), Exhibit 63 as included in the 
record before this Court consists only of an indictment from Malheur County for 
the offense of assault in the first degree. (Exhibits, pp.126-128.) McClain 
indicates on appeal he filed a motion to augment contemporaneously with his 
brief to include the judgment of conviction (Appe"ant's brief, p.8, n.2), however, 
none was filed. Because this Court does not presume error, this missing portion 
of the record must be presumed to support the court's decision denying 
McClain's motion for judgment of acquittal. State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 
805,919 P.2d 333, 334 (1996) (missing portions of record presumed to support 
decision of trial court). 
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Even on the present record, McClain's claim of an inadequate record to 
support the jury's finding of guilt on the persistent violator sentencing 
enhancement fails. A persistent violator enhancement pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2514 applies to "[a]ny person convicted for the third time of a commission of a 
felony." The former convictions relied upon to support the persistent violator 
enhancement must be alleged in the indictment or information and proved at 
trial. State v. Medrain, 143 Idaho 329, 332, 14 P.3d 34, 37 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(citing State v. Cheatham, 139 Idaho 413,416,80 P.3d 349, 352 (Ct. App. 2003) 
and State v. Martinez, 102 Idaho 875, 880, 643 P.2d 555, 560 (Ct. App. 1982». 
Although the Court of Appeals' holding in State v. Williams, 103 Idaho 635, 647, 
651 P.2d 569, 581 (Ct. App. 1982), required a showing by the state at trial on a 
persistent violator sentencing enhancement "that the prior convictions were for 
felonies under the laws of the state where the offenses occurred," in order to 
prove the persistent violator enhancement, the state was only required to 
produce certified copies of judgments indicating McClain had previously been 
convicted of two prior felonies. I.C. § 19-2514; I.R.E. 803(8), 902(4); see 
Medrain, 143 Idaho at 333, 144 P.3d at 37 ("a certified copy of a judgment of 
conviction" along with evidence establishing identity of person formerly convicted 
is sufficient to prove persistent violator enhancement); State v. Smith, 116 Idaho 
553, 560, 777 P .2d 1226, 1233 (Ct. App. 1989) (in order to prove persistent 
violator enhancement, "the state needed only to produce copies of judgments 
specifically identifying the crimes as felonies, or - if the judgments were not so 
specific - to offer admissible copies of the felony statutes applicable to the 
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crimes recited in the judgments"). The evidence before this jury was sufficient to 
make the finding. 
Here, the evidence admitted by stipulation at trial by the state to prove 
McClain had a prior felony conviction from the state of Oregon consisted of a 
certified copy of a judgment of conviction indicating McClain had been convicted 
of an assault in the third degree and an indictment for the original charge of 
assault in the first degree and delivery of an imitation controlled substance. 
(Exhibits, pp. 1, 126-128.) Exhibit 63 as found in this Court's record consists of 
the indictment which reads McClain did "unlawfu"y, feloniously and intentionally 
cause serious physical injury" to another with a "dangerous weapon." (Exhibits, 
p.126.) The information specifically states the conduct was done "unlawfu"y, 
feloniously, and intentiona"y." (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.408, Ls.11-15.) The 
evidence before the jury included the fact that McClain was charged with a felony 
assault charge for using a dangerous weapon on another person and that 
McClain was convicted of an assault of a different degree. 
McClain does not claim he was not convicted of an assault for using a 
dangerous weapon on another person. He does not argue the evidence 
insufficient to establish he is the individual listed on the indictment or the 
judgment of conviction. He does not dispute the charge involved an assault 
against a person with a dangerous weapon. McClain only asserts it is unclear 
from the judgment of conviction taken with the indictment whether or not he was 
convicted of a felony. Because the information regarding the nature of the 
offense charged by indictment coupled with the information from the judgment 
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clearly identifies McClain's prior assault conviction as a felony, McClain has 
failed to establish the state presented insufficient evidence to support the jury's 
verdict finding him guilty of being a persistent violator. 
II. 
McClain Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred in Admitting The 
Unredacted Video of McClain's Interrogation With Law Enforcement 
A. Introduction 
McClain asserts the district court erred in admitting a copy of an 
interrogation contrary to its prior ruling finding evidence of McClain's prior bad 
acts inadmissible. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-17.) McClain's argument fails 
because it is unsupported by the record. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Rulings under !.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: 
whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given 
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 
1185,1187 (2009); State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667,670,978 P.2d 227, 230 
(1999). 
C. McClain Has Failed To Establish Error In The Admission Of His 
Interrogation At Trial 
Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if (a) it is relevant for any purpose 
other than to prove the defendant's character in order to show he acted in 
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conformity therewith, and (b) the potential prejudice associated with proof of 
character does not substantially outweigh the proper probative value of the 
evidence. LR.E. 404(b); State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 
(1999). The first prong of this test is met if the evidence is admissible for any 
purpose other than proving character and actions in conformity therewith, 
including proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. LR.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 
Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83,87,785 P.2d 
647, 651 (Ct. App. 1989). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence 
if the danger of unfair prejudice from having the jury conclude the defendant is of 
bad character substantially outweighs its proper probative value. State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275-276, 77 P.3d 956, 964-965 (2003). This weighing 
process is "committed to the judge's sound discretion." State v. Buzzard, 110 
Idaho 800,802,718 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Ct. App. 1986). 
McClain asserts on appeal the interrogation recording contained 
statements of McClain's prior bad acts in violation of the court's prior ruling that 
such evidence was inadmissible. (Appellant's brief, p.12.) The specific 
statements complained of include McClain's acknowledgment "that he had put 
his kids through a bunch of 'bullshit' before," a statement that McClain's wife had 
hurt him and he has "hurt people," and he has "been that person before" when 
asked about his capability to snap under certain circumstances. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.12-13.) McClain asserts the court failed to properly analyze the 
evidence at question and erred by simply asserting "that will be the ruling of the 
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court." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) McClain fails to consider the fact the court 
previously conducted the analysis when making its initial ruling on his objection. 
Before the beginning of the first jury trial, the court heard argument on the 
state's motion in limine regarding evidence of prior bad acts. The court ruled 
that, although slightly relevant, evidence that McClain exercised control over his 
victim throughout their relationship was not admissible in the state's case in chief 
because of the risk of unfair prejudice to McClain. (10/14/2010 Tr., p.39, L.4-
p.43, L.10.) As the first trial began, McClain argued an already redacted copy of 
his interrogation was not sufficiently redacted and requested the court order 
further redaction in accordance with its previous Rule 403 ruling. (11/08/2010 JT 
Tr., p.56, L.22 - p.58, L.13.) Both parties made argument to the court with the 
understanding that, the court would rule on whether further redaction was 
required after it had the opportunity to review the video. (11/08/2010 JT Tr., 
p.65, Ls.2-4.) The trial began and ultimately ended in mistrial after the second of 
the state's witnesses took the stand and volunteered testimony that violated the 
court's prior evidentiary ruling disallowing evidence of prior bad acts. 
(11/08/2010 JT Tr., p.103, L.23 - p.1 05, p.6.) 
As the second trial began two days later, the court indicated it had 
reviewed the 68 minute video previously argued by McClain to be inadmissible. 
Although McClain asserts on appeal there was no analysis by the court before 
ruling the video admissible (Appellant's brief, p.13), he overlooks the discussion 
on the record prior to jury selection in the second trial: 
THE COURT: The court was able to view the 68-minute 
video, and there had been a defense motion in limine requesting 
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that the court exclude the first 57 minutes and 20 seconds of the 
video as well as the final 4 minutes of the video. 
The first 57 minutes and 20 seconds contains relevant 
evidence on elements of one or more matters upon which the state 
has the burden of proof. And the evidence is relevant, and I do not 
believe that consideration of waste of time or unfair prejudice to the 
defendant outweighs that relevance. Therefore, the motion to 
exclude the first 57 minutes and 20 seconds of the video is denied. 
The final 4 minutes, though, I would like to hear more 
argument on that issue. What is your objection precisely to the 
final 4 minutes, Mr. McKenzie? 
MR. MCKENZIE [defense counsel]: Judge, and I don't know if this 
was clear before. In that earlier portion where [Detective] 
Brechwald is stating, "This is what Janna [McClain] told me and this 
is the truth," or where he says, referring to the bruising, like at 49 
minutes and 25 seconds, "These are bruising [sic] that can only be 
caused by someone suffering from domestic violence." 
THE COURT: Oh, no kidding. I guess I didn't pick up on that. 
MR MCKENZIE: Well, I could point out the exact minutes where 
those occur. 
THE COURT: So it's the police officer interrogating the 
defendant and making the statement? 
MR MCKENZIE: Right. So like at 38 minutes, 30 seconds, to 44 
minutes, Brechwald speculates as to the source and timing of the 
bruising. 
THE COURT: And you say Brechwald, that's the policeman? 
MR. MCKENZIE: The detective. 
THE COURT: So 38 minutes to [sic] 30 seconds to 44 
minutes, right? 
MR. MCKENZIE: Right. 
THE COURT: And he is speculating as to the cause of the 
bruises. 
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MR. MCKENZIE: Source and timing of bruising, refers to 
hearsay statements from Janna; claims that the state has certain 
physical evidence such as MRI. At 44 minutes, 35 seconds, the 
detective says the state does not need Janna as a witness 
because it has physical evidence. 
From 44 minutes to 47 minutes, Detective Brechwald 
discussed this more as hearsay statements, asserts that it is 
obvious that the defendant is lying. Again says the state has 
certain physical evidence, including MRI, and says that the 
defendant's explanation is not reasonable. 
All those things are opinion evidence he wouldn't be able to 
offer on the stand and shouldn't come in. 
And then at 49 minutes, 25 seconds, the detective 
speculates that bruising came from Janna being shaken, which I 
don't even think is asserted by any party, Judge. And from then on 
there's quite a bit of the detective discussing just in general men in 
America need to be taking responsibility for their actions. That the 
defendant needs to take responsibility. 
And then the last 4 minutes from 64 to the end, there's some 
general discussion, and the detective says, "You're going to have a 
difficult time selling your story to other people." There's more 
discussion about possible motives of Janna and her mother and 
discussion unrelated to [the night of the incident]. 
(11/10/2010JTTr., p.13, L.10-p.16, L.10.) 
The state countered McClain's argument, calling it a mischaracterization 
in some respects. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.16, Ls.17-20.) The state asserted the 
detective confronted McClain with physical evidence as an interrogation 
technique and discussed with him the motives of the witnesses against him to lie. 
(11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.16, L.31 - p.17, L.s 18.) The final four minutes involved 
discussion of why McClain thought the witnesses were making up this story 
about his alleged rape and physical abuse of his wife; those four minutes 
encompassed McClain's attack of the credibility of the witnesses against him. 
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(11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.18, L.11 - p.19, L.13.) Upon considering the state's 
argument of relevance, the court ruled the final four minutes of the interrogation 
were admissible in the state's case in chief, thus overruling McClain's objection 
to the redacted video in its entirety. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.19, Ls.14-15.) 
Following jury selection and the commencement of the state's 
presentation of evidence, McClain again objected to the introduction by the state 
of the 68-minute video interrogation "based upon the court's earlier ordering on 
[the] motion under 404 where the court made a ruling that prior acts and wrongs, 
although may be relevant, are unduly prejudicial" as said video was "fraught with 
references to prior acts or wrongs." (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.224, Ls.1-8.) After 
brief argument by McClain, the state stood on its previous argument to the court 
on the issue and requested it stand by its previous ruling that the entire interview 
was admissible. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.226, Ls.22-25.) The court stood by its 
previous ruling. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.227, Ls.1-2.) 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) is a relevance rule. State v. Avila, 137 
Idaho 410, 412-413, 49 P.3d 1260, 1262-1263 (Ct. App. 2002). However, as 
discussed previously, when the state seeks to admit evidence subject to I.R.E. 
404(b), the court must not only determine if the evidence is relevant for a 
purpose beyond criminal propensity, it must also determine, pursuant to I.R.E. 
403, whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice. Cross, 132 Idaho at 670, 978 P.2d 227 at 230. 
The evidence McClain complains of on appeal appears to be limited to 
statements that he had put his kids through "bullshit" before, he had "hurt 
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people" and he had been the kind of person to snap under pressure. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.12-13.) McClain now argues these statements were not 
relevant to any issue other than propensity and the court erred by admitting 
them. (Appellant's brief, p.14.) The district court correctly determined that the 
evidence was relevant for purposes beyond criminal propensity when 
determining the statements made by McClain in his attempt to attack the 
credibility of those he believed to be making up stories at his expense were 
relevant. (11/10/2010 JT Tr., p.13, L.10 - p.19, L.13.) In further concluding that 
the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice pursuant to I.R.E. 403, the district court ultimately conducted 
an analysis that satisfied the requirements of admission pursuant to I.R.E. 
404(b). (Id.) Thus, the district court did not ultimately err in admitting the 
evidence. 
Even if the district court had erred in permitting the introduction of the 
three contested statements made by McClain during his interrogation, such error 
was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Idaho Criminal Rule 52 
provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect 
substantial rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52. "The inquiry is whether, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] 
even without the admission of the challenged evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 
Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)); see also 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). These brief 
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statements were a small part of a 58-minute interrogation, which was itself a 
small part of a trial with six state witnesses and what the district court deemed "a 
very strong case" for the state. (10/14/2010 Tr., p.42, Ls.12-13.) 
Even if the evidence was not intrinsic to the charged crimes, and thus 
subject to 404(b), the district court did not err in ultimately admitting it, because 
its relevancy and I.R.E. 403 analyses satisfied the I.R.E. 404(b) requirements for 
admission. Finally, even if the district court erred in admitting 58-minute 
interrogation as previously redacted by the state, such error was clearly harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court should thus affirm McClain's conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully asks this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction 
entered after a jury found McClain guilty of felony domestic battery, violation of a 
no contact order, and intimidation of a witness with a sentencing enhancement 
for being a persistent violator. 
DATED this 13th day of June 201 
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